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TO INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY,
A STUDY OF THE AMERICAN HIGH COMMAND

RICHARD E. BARRY

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Richard L. Barry

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A STUDY OF THE AMERICAN HIGH COMMAND**

by

Richard E. Barry

Lieutenant, United States Navy

**Submitted in fulfillment of the
requirements for the course**

INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH

MN 400

**United States Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California**

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ABSTRACT

This paper is a 100 page study of the American High Command - the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It analyzes the environment in which the present defense organization functions, with special emphasis on the major dichotomies influencing our defense organizations, policies, and behavior: wartime vs. peacetime; civilian control vs. military control; centralization vs. decentralization; unification vs. separation; hardware vs. software; economy vs. strength; military comptrollership vs. civilian comptrollership; et al. Interface problems are highlighted. After a brief review of the historical development of the present defense organization, an analysis is made of the implications of employing either the Joint Staff or General Staff concepts at the National Military Command level. A concluding endorsement of the Joint Staff concept and system follows, with recommendations for its improvement and a look toward the future development of the American High Command.

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"As long as there is a boundary between the political and military authority, and this is an essential feature of a democracy, any so-called perfect Whitehall machine is impossible."

—Air Vice Marshal E. J. Kingston-McCloughry
in Defense Policy and Strategy

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To Professor Leslie Darbyshire, I owe whatever better understanding of organization theory and behavior I may have after a year under his penetrating tutorship.

To my father-in-law, confidant, and dear friend, Edgar S. Cox, I owe a great deal of my curiosity about matters of national concern. Strong of mind, sturdy of body, gentle of heart, he personifies the American Tradition which we all strive so hard to preserve and build.

And to my wife, Linda, I am especially thankful for so much coffee and sympathy, and labor in typing and proofreading this paper.

The opinions or expressions herein are the private judgements of the author. They are not to be construed as official or as reflecting the views or policies of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or any other agency of the United States Government. The author acknowledges complete responsibility for the contents of this paper.

PREFACE

Never before in our history, with the exception of the war years, has our National High Command had such an influence on the lives of every American. Even the smallest town newspapers reflect this concern daily throughout our great country. The stakes have never been higher. The price of error has never been greater.

It is an unprecedented responsibility which our National High Command has of insuring the domestic tranquility in these critical times. It is little less of a responsibility which every American has to understand the nature and responsibilities of the National High Command and its relationship to the entire organization for national security. Only with such an understanding will the National High Command be done.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT:THE GREAT DICHOTOMIES

In Roman mythology we are told of the god of war, Mars, and how he was given two names - Quiri'nus for when he was complacent; Grad'ivus for when he was war-like. Thus, the Romans built two temples, one within the walls of the city for Mars Quiri'nus that he might keep the peace, and one without for Mars Grad'ivus, that he might counsel them in war. How well the Romans understood the schizophrenia that is the lot of men of war, even when deified; for, elementary as it may appear, it is the states of war and peace which have had the greatest continuous influence over the character of military men and their social order. Because these states traditionally have been diametrically opposed in nature, their appearance and disappearance over the pages of history have often left behind a trail of chaos, uncertainty, misunderstanding and vacillation with those in whom the defense of nations was vested.

To be victorious in war, military machines must be well tooled and lubricated. As the times advance, so does the need for these machines to be so kept in time of peace; yet the ever-increasing list of commentators on national security still talk about the roles of the

military in peace and war in widely differing vocabularies, often realizing that something is wrong, but not knowing exactly what. Even the casual reader of the 1958 Defense Reorganization Hearings cannot help but read the frustration between the lines:

It is the intent of Congress...not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the Armed Forces, nor an Armed Forces General Staff...

Such an organization is clearly desirable in battle, where time is everything. At the top levels of government, where planning precedes, or should precede, action by a considerable period of time, a deliberate decision is infinitely preferable to a bad decision. Likewise, the weighing of legitimately opposed alternative courses of action is one of the main processes of free government. Thus a general staff organization - which is unswervingly oriented to quick decision and obliteration of alternative courses - is a fundamentally fallible, and thus dangerous, instrument for determination of national policy. ¹

Although he did not develop the idea of dichotomy as such, Stanley spoke in surprise of the same problem in another time:

The Joint Board (Army and Navy)...was not adapted to the demands of wartime. Indeed, it was suspended by President Wilson during the American neutrality in World War I on the surprising ground that it might encourage preparation for war before the United States was involved! ²

The literature of national security affairs and

¹House of Representatives Report No.1765; Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, USGPO, Wash. D.C., 1958, p.27.

²Stanley, Timothy W., American Defense and National Security; Public Affairs Press, Wash.D.C., 1956, p.67.

history itself is replete with instances of split roles and organizations. It makes the conscientious or even curious ask the question: What is the proper role of the military high command in peace or war? What is their relationship to the civilian high command? If not every American, at least every officer must answer these questions for himself. He cannot make sense of his place in our society unless he does. And society cannot make sense of him.

Certainly no rational person in a democratic society would suggest that military commanders or organizations should enjoy the same freedom of action or degree of activity in time of peace as they must in time of war. But it is also true that we must review our policy of the dual standards of organization for defense - in war and peace. Can we afford to reorganize for war after we have lost the peace?

If there is a single thread running through the history of American defense, it is two-stranded: war and peace. War with its stresses on weapons, hardware, the big noise, strong and decisive military leadership with authority; peace with its drives for defense economy, and control over military activities and power - on the one hand concentration of military power; on the

other, dispersion of that power.

The environment of high command is full of dichotomies. But the one between war and peace is the greatest force of all.

The advent of the atomic bomb and the requirement for presidential authority to release any such weapon, has been the greatest influencing factor to come from war since the bomb was first dropped. It placed the President, as Commander-in-Chief, directly into what years ago would have been regarded as tactical situations, but which today, whether regarded so or not, are strategic. This event has been and still is reshaping our defense organization. Responsibility begets control, and this has very real consequences at the organization level of the Pentagon. Walls and other partitions come down, others go up, phone numbers change, people retire, people are retired.

The greatest modern force molding our defense organization, to come from a period of peace, has been the popular acceptance of economists and the tools of their profession. (The professional military officer finds it difficult to resist comparing the economists to the nuclear bomb, and the general conflagration, smoke in high places, and blast effect which attend both.) Hitch³

³Hitch, C.J. and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1961, p.19.

tells us that we can no longer mobilize our economy after the outbreak of hostilities - only before. And since he claims the most efficient strategy is also the most economical, he says that it is consistent that both our strategy and economy should be optimized before hostilities.

For a society, as for an individual, the metamorphosis between wartime and peacetime living is a very traumatic thing. It shakes the very soul of national existence - from the basic national objectives to the time people get up in the morning; from the government spending policy to the price of shoes, or the ability to buy shoes; from the words of great men to the lives of high school kids; from the fundamental mix in the national economic pie to what'll you have in your coffee, sir? Now changing drinking habits is not the simplest matter in the world; yet, somehow, we seem to think that shifting from a wartime to a peacetime military organization - from the professional, military wartime frame of mind and value set, to a new frame of mind, a new set of values - we seem to think that these things are simpler! We become so immersed in the business of getting on with the peace that the first and natural thing to undo is the enormous military complex. It

must change dramatically in size, composition, mission, and modus operandi. To a great extent, of course, this is true. But in our haste we do not contemplate the enduring nature of certain military functions. It is not until sometime later, when sparks of fear begin to fly, and remembrances of days past begin to be recalled, that the national psyche is ready to review. By now it is a different animal altogether which is under review and all the more confusing for it.

In other days, after other wars, this was not such a calamitous policy to pursue. Time permitted reshaping. No longer. What was once called 'the mobilization period' is no longer always a relevant, meaningful, or even real thing. The fact that mobilization was possible in Berlin, Cuba, and Vietnam does not mean that it will always be that way. It could, and would, in any all-out nuclear exchange, be replaced by an execution period. In other words, the period which we depended upon traditionally to prepare to do things will be replaced by a period during which we do things. This hypothesis says that we must now be prepared to do, rather than simply to get prepared. It means that that someone to a certain extent must have a rational wartime frame of mind which is not inconsistent with the peacetime world in

which he lives. This may seem impossible by definition. But that particular someone (quite plural in fact), not being a robot, must be able to make sense of himself in the world in which he exists. The hypothesis says further that there must be an organization in which that someone is relevant; an organization which reflects the dichotomy of military preparedness in peacetime; an organization which - God forgive the world in which we live - exists in spite of the 'peace'!

Professor Morris Janowitz, the sociologist from Michigan, raised this whole problem in his explanation of the constabulary force concept:

The use of force in international relations has been so altered that it seems appropriate to speak of constabulary forces, rather than of military forces....

The military establishment becomes a constabulary when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory....

The constabulary force concept encompasses the entire range of military power and organization.... weapons of mass destruction....military aid programs....and counter-guerilla warfare....

No longer is it feasible for the officer corps, if it is to be organized effectively for strategic deterrence and for limited war, to operate on a double standard of "peacetime" and "wartime" premises. Since the constabulary force concept eliminates the distinction between the peacetime and wartime establishment, it draws on the police concept.⁴

⁴Janowitz, Morris; The Professional Soldier, A Social and Political Portrait, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, pp. 418-419.

The military officer is aware of the need to eliminate reaction time. He thinks about it in terms of airborne alert forces, submerged or 'hardened' missile striking power, dispersed land forces, continuity of command, emergency evacuation plans, controllable bore or selective war plans, pre-taped messages and advanced command and control systems, including large automatic information systems. He does not always think about it in terms of the changing image in the mirror, and what it means; much less does his suburban neighbor, very likely a veteran of World War II, perceive the new-school chisel-work of Mars Modernus.

In retrospect, it would take some dozen organization charts to show graphically the growth and organizational trends in the military establishment since the late eighteenth century. It would take nearly as many charts to show the changes made in the chain of command during the same period: they do not necessarily correspond to the changes made in the organizations for defense. (It is interesting to note that while the chain of command has such a great influence on the whole defense organization, and while it is in many ways the heart of the matter, the author was unable to find any extensive

treatment of the subject per se.) Rather than include a compendium of organizational charts, only two are shown. The others are easily obtained in annual editions of the U.S. Government Organizational Manual and various professional magazines and journals, and the primary purpose here is not an historical account.


A brief inspection of Figure 1, the defense organization resulting from the National Security Act of 1947, and Figure 2, the present organization, shows the dramatic changes which have been made in the past 15 years. What it does not show is that most of the changes have been made in the past 5 years. Prior to 1960 there were no defense agencies, or 'super-agencies' as they are often termed, with the exception of the highly specialized Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) and National Security Agency (NSA).

Today there are super-agencies with broad functions and powers in the areas of supply, communications, and intelligence (DSA:DCA:DIA). The creation of these agencies took many of the vitals out of the service organizations, in terms of functions, expert personnel, space and influence. Figures 3 and 4 show what has happened to the chain of command since 1927. It has practically

FIGURE 1


UNIFICATION OF THE MILITARY SERVICES *

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947



* From American Defense and National Security,
by Timothy W. Stanley, Public Affairs Press,
Washington, D.C., 1956, p. 81.

FIGURE 2



*Organization of the Defense Department in December 1961**

* From NAVAL REVIEW 1962-1963, "The McNamara Era in the Defense Department", by William R. Kintner, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., p.107.

NATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND - 1927




FIGURE 3

NATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND - 1963




FIGURE 4

been reversed, placing the advisory (dotted line) Joint Chiefs into the chain of command and removing the services from operational control of forces. This was primarily a result of the 1958 Reorganization Act. What remains? Personnel support, doctrine, certain communications, 'retail' supply and R&D. It should be no wonder that the military chief of staff feels frustration over his role. He says that they told him in 1958 that his role as service chief was support, with which they removed all but a handful of his forces from his operational control. So he supported. In 1960 he was told that long haul communications had to be coordinated to ensure rapid communications between the President and the unified and specific commands (and below). The following year he was told that intelligence reports were not consistent from service to service. And then there was something about belt buckles.

Each time the problem was solved by unification under the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) or the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). There are degrees of unification, and one need not talk about a single service to talk about unification. The defense agencies are a case in hand. The service reactions varied from the Navy, at

one end of the spectrum, hauling up all the canvas it could take trying to keep the weather gage; to the Air Force on the other, taking off without a turn-up, to gain early control of the scene of action. While one was bitterly fighting to retain the status quo, the other was busily offering spaces, experienced directors, and ready made data bases as starters. The Army, either through a policy that it had nothing to lose through unification, or through no policy at all, did not take a strong stand. The Marine Corps, as usual, stayed away from the whole mess and somehow avoided any serious effects.

The proponents of unification said it was long overdue. The days of strictly uni-service operations were over. And joint operations meant joint planning, joint following, and to a large extent joint support. They said they were tired of service provincialism ("AIR FORCE EYES ONLY" or "NAVY EYES ONLY"), politics, duplication of effort, parallel reporting and obsolescence. They said that the JCS system worked during World War II and was working now. They said that younger officers of the three services, as well as some flag officers, got along perfectly well and were highly respected by one another. What was wrong with the others? What were they afraid of?

The others did not think it was that simple. They said the idea of unifying this or that function was not what bothered them so much as it was their concern over where it would end. They thought they knew. They feared that one service would eventually gain control and strangle the life-breath out of the others; that instead of being three 'provincial' services, unification would lead us to be all provincial in the same way! That the variances of opinion were signs of life and health - that no stone would remain unturned.

They said that they were sick of politics too, but that you had to fight fire with fire. They cited examples of so-called joint groups, away from the tri-service scrutiny of the Washington area, which, after insulating the minority representatives, were worse than uni-service in provincialism. When the services were separate, people were more aware of differences and the need for coordination. When they were together, it was assumed there were no unsolved differences. Coordination was taken for granted. Yet one service dominated to untold extents. If what they had seen was a sample, they wanted no part of unification.

It was more than self-perpetuation, they said. We

had a responsibility to make matters in which we were experienced a consideration in our national strategy. If we didn't listen to what the others knew best and if they didn't listen to us, we would be again committed to the single channel strategy, such as we were in the days of massive retaliation - a strategy which they said cost more in ground lost and dollars spent than ever before in our history. While the money went into greenhouses and two mile runways, the action went on over the beaches of Lebanon, the swamps of Vietnam, and in the Formosa Strait. It was, they said, a strategy based on a model world, not the real world. They spoke of rats and elephant guns. But in the end it was not so much the strategy itself as it was its negation of all other possible strategies. And this was what could happen when one service predominated. You asked what we were afraid of, they said: that's what we're afraid of. We're scared to hell, if you want to know.

But their arguments were not altogether upheld, or at least their point of view was not. The proponents of unification said that the single point of view had not been avoided through the separate service system. In fact, the massive retaliation strategy had predominated in a period of considerable service interdependence.

With more unification, such an event would be nearly impossible, because plans would be made by individuals of the three services simultaneously. The 'status-quoticians' said their point had been proved by acknowledgement of such a naive assumption. Wait and see, they said. Wait and see.

Unification and centralization are not synonymous, but they live and grow in the same climate. And while centralization in the Department of Defense is usually attributed only to the efforts of Secretary McNamara, other forces converged to add their influence. Centralization of information was an outgrowth of our sheer inability to manage information by manual methods, and the growing need for Presidential control over nuclear forces. Where information is centralized, so will be decisions and power. The use of advanced computer information systems in the services shook the hornets nest of compatibility, but only lightly at first. The Congressional restraints on the number of officers permitted in the Joint Staff (J-Staff), when related to the functions of the staff, fostered - indeed legislated - within the Staff an inability to cope with the information it needed and got from the unified and specified commands.

Under such conditions a DIA was inevitable, if only from the point of view of repudiating the inability of J-2 to manage joint intelligence information. To a large extent the same was true of DASA's Damage Assessment Center (DODDAC) with regard to J-3; DSA and J-4; DCA and J-6. It was the only way short of legislation, and Congress was already concerned over the size of the J-Staff. The unmanageability of operational information in the Joint War Room (JWR) and Joint War Room Annex (JWRA) was demonstrated even when challenged by some of the most outstanding personnel the services could order to fill the JWR/JWRA positions.

The Joint Staff finally acknowledged that it would have to establish its own information system. Though in its infancy, the Navy had already begun on a large scale basis in the Navy Information Center (NAVIC), and the Air Force had begun on an intermediate scale in the Air Force Command Post. The Army was already laying false floors and building fire proof tape vaults.

The idea of a National Military Command System (NMCS) with a National Military Command Center (NMCC), an enlarged and automated JWR/JWRA et al, receiving input from the service information systems as well as other agencies in the Washington area, began to take shape. The World-Wide Military Command and Control System embodied the NMCS and the unified and specified

commands. The compatibility problem took on new dimensions and vastly more depth. The whole theory of standards came into play, from character standards at one end of the spectrum on through word, message structure, and semantic to behavioral standards at the other end. These trespassed not only into data standards, but programming standards, programming language standards, data base, file generation and maintenance, display, hardware standards, etc. When such matters of compatibility become paramount they are inevitably handled through unification of resources and centralization of authority. It was bound to happen; and together, because neither unification nor centralization alone could overcome the incompatibility of the service systems. Not only are the service systems incompatible with one another, but each, to varying degrees, is incompatible with the NMCC. The DCA only now, through the National Military Command System Support Center (previously DODDAC), has the necessary authority and talent to undertake to solve the problem. More authority and talent will be needed before anyone is on top of the problem. These are but examples. There are many others - targetting, military assistance, military legislation, military liaison with other government agencies, to mention but a few. These are some of the forces which, with or without SECDEF's guiding hand, have helped to shape the path toward unification and

centralization. A good case may be made for the argument that further delay in unifying effort and centralizing authority would have caused the services to become so entangled in incompatible systems that the only way out might well have been the single service itself. There is little doubt that, without the influence of SECDEF, the services would not on their own have generated the degree of unification needed to overcome the effects of modern warfare and technology. They were each already too committed to their own standards to give in to the others.

Perhaps better than anyone else, the Secretary of Defense understood the power that would be invested in a centralized and unified command system, and the need for close civilian control over the new capability, from its inception. Furthermore, he understood the opposite hypothesis also - that the system was needed to effectively control our vast operating forces. In the 1963 appropriation hearings, Secretary McNamara said:

Achievement of our overall national security objectives requires that our strategic retaliatory forces be kept continually under the control of the constituted authorities, from the President on down to the commanders of these forces - before, during, and after a nuclear attack. Funds are included in this budget to further improve and strengthen this command and control system.⁵

⁵Department of Defense Appropriations for 1963, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations (HR), Part 2, Secretary of Defense, et al, Overall Financial Statements, USGPO, Wash., D.C., 1962, p.19.

The changing faces of war and peace have caused more and more difficulty in distinguishing between tactical and strategic operations. This is because so many 'tactical' operations have taken on strategic proportions. A sortie of aircraft twenty years ago did not have gross strategic effects. Today, one aircraft may. When so-called 'routine tactical operations' are conducted in Berlin as a reply to a politico-military problem in the Caribbean, the decisions must be raised to a very high level. Years ago, a high degree of centralization of decision-making was a matter involving choices. Today, it is a property of the new environment - a reality about which we must adapt.

This does not mean that we must simply be animals of reaction. On the contrary - it means that we must be more purposeful and decisive in our development than ever before. We can no longer afford to stand back and watch ourselves evolve and expect the results to reflect our will. The services have the alternative of accepting this as a matter of real life and providing responsible leadership in our defense organizational and operational developments, or of not accepting it, and seriously risking loss of military leadership in the national command structure. The latter course might be charitably termed 'ostrichism'. If we are concerned about the potentially dangerous consequences of increased centrali-

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zation of authority in OSD, as we should be in our roles as citizens of a free and non-belligerent nation, then our efforts should be directed toward providing for adequate checks and balances. At least our efforts should not be toward the recovery of sunk costs. They should not be toward attempting to make decisions which, for better or worse, the complicated state of world affairs in great part has long since made for us.

We have considered some of the more formal or 'statutory' aspects of the defense organization, which provide much of the official environment in which our defense leaders operate. This is but one aspect and not always the most important.

Superimposed over the formal organization and seldom shown on the organization charts is the semi-formal or board organization. This is the problem-oriented organization of Task Forces and Battle Teams which are created to solve special problems or follow certain crises. They are formed from the fabric of the services, the J-Staff, and OSD depending upon the nature of the problem or crisis. They are usually temporary, though some have been determined to be of more lasting value and chartered as a board, in which case they find their way into organizational charts. Normally, however, they are created where problems requiring unusual coordination and liaison arise, and are disestablished upon

transmittal of a final report.

The informal organization does not exist in chart form, nor could it ever except in the past tense. The closest one could come to a graphic display of this organization would be through a compilation of every Bates List Finder (flip-top telephone directory) in the Pentagon. This would not be the same thing as inspecting a DoD telephone directory.

The informal organization is that organization which accomplishes the tasks and carries out the policies and directives which are iterated through the formal organization. But it is not simply a responsive organization. It is also an organization through which new ideas are generated, many of which are formalized, approved, and regenerated through the formal organization as new or changed policies or directives. This organization is made possible by personal contact - by telephones, conference rooms, cafeterias, the executive dining room, the Secretarial and Chief of Staff messes, the hot dog stand in the center of the Pentagon inner court (commonly known as Ground Zero), the Toastmaster's breakfast club (first names only), the concourse, the Pentagon corridors, the Athletic Club under the ramp leading to the Eighth Corridor Entrance, various watches, the Fort Meyer Officer's Club, and a delicatessen on Columbia Pike, not to mention various service academy, squadron,

command and ship reunions, neighborhood, office, society and official parties. It is a very complex organization, changing every time someone is ordered in or out - changing daily. There is very little relevance to rank in the informal organization, and many military officers do not wear uniforms.

The forces at work are too numerous to list in more than a partial manner. Internally there are pressures, more often helpful than deleterious, caused by differences in the individual backgrounds of officers (line, staff, specialist, subspecialist and generalist, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force - even some Coast Guard and Foreign Service), officer turnover, civilian-military relationships, deadlines, general orientation toward crisis operations, power struggles, directives, policies and excitement, as well as a pervading sense of bigness - of involvement in a very large enterprise with high standards and an inexhaustible supply of critics. There are semi-external forces as well, emanating from inter-service relationships; competition for funds, people and influence; evaluation of intelligence reports and perceived threats; and individuals - Robert S. McNamara, Charles Hitch and Dr. Harold Brown, for example. There are exterior forces which deeply effect defense behavior. To mention but a few: Congress, GAO, State, CIA, BoB, White House, NSC, industry, public opinion, the press, the Constitution, and an impressive

list of international economic and collective security organizations and agreements. World affairs and the economy are perpetually at work. The operating forces have an immeasurable influence, perhaps more than any other single group outside of the Administration. Technology and transportation, which have advanced the state of the military arts and sciences in quantum leaps, are tremendous forces, both internally and externally. And even though the military is closely identified and often responsible for such advances, the very size of the organization and the speed of advance make it extremely difficult for the organization to adapt. In this environment, the semiformal and particularly the informal organizations, as might be expected, are normally the most responsive. Still, the crises nature of the Pentagon makes it difficult for any effort toward long range planning to gain the attention it warrants. This is ironical in an organization which is so involved in national defense planning:

To further complicate matters, it should be pointed out that the reference to the Pentagon as a single entity is a false uplift and mainly a matter of convenience. Actually, numerous activities of the defense organization spread all over the Washington area, the continental U.S., and throughout the world shape the true environment of defense.

All of these things, and the image which the public has - indeed which the officer has - of both the 'short-time' and the professional military officer, go into the making of the environment in which people try to make sense out of defense. The critics who charge that our confusing state of affairs cannot simply be shrugged off as a sign of the times⁶ must use caution. While it is true that we cannot afford realistically to shrug off the effects of modern times, and while there is very much indeed which we can and must do to control our own destinies, it is equally true that there is nothing especially simple about modern times. There is certainly nothing simple about the effects which the current environment has on our defense organization and behavior.

Any discussion of defense environment, or any other complicated social structure for that matter, is at best a two dimensional fabrication of bits and pieces. It is little more accurate than any of the traditional stereotypes - the drinking Irishman or stingy Scotsman. And, although language is the basis of thinking and activity, ironically when one tries to explain the complex environment, language does not suffice. At least our notion

⁶ Webster, CDR Harvey C., USN, "The Message Gap", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 89, No. 5, Whole No. 573, May 1963, p. 33.

of language, our vocabulary, doesn't suffice; and like the aviator, sooner or later we get to the point at which we must use our hands to express ourselves any further. That is the point at which the author is now. But it is not as simple a matter as an Immelmann or eight-point roll, and the language of gestures is less useful than the written word, even though the environment is a spacial as well as intellectual state. The analogy of the aviator is not altogether lost, however, because it is the dynamic nature of aerobatics which drives him away from the language of words, and it is the dynamic nature of our environment which makes word descriptions inadequate. The environment of the defense organism is not described by the charts shown here. It is better described by everything else in between and since. These represent only individual frames in a motion picture. But it is the moving thing that is the real thing, not the snapshots.

Probably one of the most enduring of all of the dichotomies or problems in the defense organization is that of the relationship or interface between civilian and military officials. (Is this the personification of the war-peace conflict?) It may in fact be a pre-conception to even describe the situation as a 'problem', rather than as a form of check and balance. So

often we regard 'conflict' as a problem that it is sometimes difficult for us to understand 'beneficent conflict', which, as in the human body metabolism, may act as a homeostatic control system - a steam valve - for our governmental body.

Whether it is a problem or a system, it is a fact of life in politico-military co-existence. While in the vast majority of cases high level civilian and military officials have great respect and admiration for one another, there are occasions when it is not so. Unfortunately, when there is disagreement it is usually over an important matter, and gains quick attention in the press. By the time it has become a matter of public domain, the basic disagreement may have lost all relevancy. What originally may have been a military or economic problem, or both, is now, in the hands of the press and exploiters, a political issue. If the military officials continue to treat the problem as a military problem they will fail, unless they have a sympathetic press.

In such a conflict the basic misunderstanding is clouded by pride, position, determination to be upheld, etc. The professional military officer feels that the decision is one to be made on the basis of 'military requirements', rather than political expediency, and military requirements are his specialty. The civilian

official strikes back, feeling that it is a matter of 'civilian control' and policy, that it reaches far beyond military proportions into economics, politics, international relations, fiscal policy, law, or 'accepted practices of sound management', about all of which he knows something. The professional officer - after a long life of devotion to duty, public service and the familiar hardships of military life, with doubtful return on the hours spent in terms of thanks or his bank account - turns the tables. For years he has resented being regarded as a transient wherever he has gone. This was a function of geography. Now the question is of military significance, and in this matter it is the civilian who is the transient. He reckons that the civilian is essentially a product of the spoils system. His position is a receipt for services rendered long before he was ever appointed. His military experience may be worse than none at all. It may have been as a draftee of 18 months or 2 years - just long enough to learn to dislike everything about the military service, especially its officers. Or he may have served during the war years when things were different: the public was behind the military, there was no shortage of men, money, or materials. To need was to have in most cases. There was a real cause - a real issue. So this, the officer reckons, is how the civilian sees the military

of today, even though to him it is very different indeed. He knows his service is undermanned, under-capitalized, obsolescent and in many other ways needing. From what intelligence reports he sees, he believes there is a cause, an issue. He feels the civilian regards him as a yes-man - a doer, not a thinker - who speaks in monosyllabic terms about monosyllabic ideas when the subject is changed from strategy or tactics to nearly anything else. This the military man sees at a time when it is becoming more and more difficult for him to communicate with his subordinates, with their new vocabularies, nearly all of whom have college degrees and many of whom have advanced degrees in scientific and commercial fields, or what traditionally were considered fields of only scientific or commercial interest. In short, the military man views the officer corps as a highly select group of people who know about something other than Clausewitz, the Mahans and Douhet. He wonders if the civilian sees things quite the same way. And, at this point of the dispute, after editors and self-styled 'insiders' have made their speculations, the civilian rarely does view the officer this way.

The civilian now views the officer as a single-channelled radio which plays the same tune over and over again. He sees him in need of the kind of outside influence which only a non-military background can offer.

He sees him as one who feels that he alone has had to suffer inconvenience. The civilian, after frequently taking his appointment against his will, and then often only by persuasion of the President, has also suffered inconvenience. He has often taken his position at great financial loss, both in salary and in his greatly changed ability to invest. He may have to liquidate investments at a time which he knows is to his disadvantage. But he must if he is to avoid irresponsible charges of 'conflict of interests'. He knows that sooner or later he is going to be asked to open his financial portfolio for public viewing. He may have had to tear up stakes to come to Washington, a city he never particularly cared for anyway, knowing full well that no matter what he did he would be criticized by someone - if not the American Legion then maybe the Americans for Democratic Action. He works as late and as hard as the best of the military. He sees the need to put the military in its place from time to time, and this may be a good time. He sees the military as a split house, often fighting from service to service. If the services cannot themselves agree, what is so sanctified about the 'holy military opinion'. He sees the military as behind the times. While he knows that great scientific advances are made in the military many times before they are made in the commercial world, he feels that most of this is the work of civilian

scientists either working for or under contract to the government. He regards the management practices in the military as archaic. He feels that the military officer holds things back from him, things which he must know if he is to manage the military organization, and it is his responsibility to do just that. He wants the expert military advice but feels that he does not have the confidence of those who can give it. He frequently is forced to get advice through circuitous routes, through his top civilian staff members to the more junior military men, or from military officers on his own staff.

The officer says that the decision is his to make because he has the expertness of military knowledge to make it. The civilian says: knowledge or no knowledge, he has the ultimate responsibility and is therefore entitled to make the decision. What is more, he is in fact making the decision even if he permits the military man to do it for him.

By this time the speculations in the newspaper are getting closer. Soon, perhaps, the tension will get to the breaking point and the officer will be dismissed. Or he will resign. Regardless of the action involved, it is rarely a question of whom to 'retire', civilian or military. It is a question of military or not. No matter in how much esteem the President may hold the officer, the civilian appointed to direct that officer

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must be upheld. In exceptional cases this is not necessarily true.

If the officer resigns or is dismissed, the corps begins to worry as a group that the civilians want to make puppets out of the military in general. The best officers will not under such conditions remain in the service. That price they will not pay. And unless the civilian takes positive steps of greater proportions than a press leak, the dissatisfaction will grow, resistance will increase, objectivity will wane, and the time between feuds lessen.

This is indeed the extreme. The question is, can it be avoided. The answer must be that it can be ^{completely} avoided only by dictum. At that it can never be removed altogether as a definite subterranean force, even though it may be eliminated as a force on the surface. In other words, the alternative is a fiction. The reason it is a fiction is because, beyond the fundamental principle of ultimate civilian control in any matter, or the bi-linear system, there cannot in real life be any clear distinction between what is the proper and lawful role of a civilian official and what is the rightful realm of a military official. Broad guidelines can be established, and have been. In most instances they work, out not always. We can say, for example, that problems of especially military significance should be solved by

military officials, and problems of essentially management, economic or political natures are properly in the sphere of civilian decision. But the words "especially" and "essentially" or other such qualitative descriptors are always open to interpretation. They will vary with the intricacy of the problem in question, the time at which it is raised and, most important, the personalities of the principals involved.

A former Secretary of one of the military departments, who shall remain unnamed, was asked by the author: Can there be any clear lines established which will ensure smooth working relationships between civilian and military officials? His answer was that there could not - particularly at a time when military problems have taken on greater and greater significance in what used to be regarded as non-military areas. He further indicated that this was a good thing. When military men stand up to be counted, whatever the cost, and civilians do the same, we are more likely, more often, to come to the best decisions. The price we must pay from time to time when matters reach a boiling point is high indeed. But the prices of more extreme systems, which may not ostensibly reach the boiling point as often, would be considerably higher in terms of the best decisions being made in the national interest.

The Hoover Commission subcommittee report on special

personnel problems recommended a policy for placing military and civilian officials (Recommendation No. 26):

The criteria on which such a policy can be established are:

Military Personnel Assignments

- a. All combat-related support activities and positions and organization immediately supporting operational forces exposed to potential enemy action.
- b. Positions in supplier-related activities necessary for the training of officers for combat-related support.
- c. To provide the user experience to supplier-related support.

Civilian Personnel Assignments

- a. Where management and technical skills usual to the civilian economy are required and can be exercised without the necessity of military status.
- b. Where continuity of management and experience can be better provided by civilians.
- c. At fixed support activities throughout the world.⁷

The next recommendation was that such criteria as listed above should be expedited to eliminate practices of duplicate staffing.

Upon initial review these recommendations may seem to make sense, but a deeper look raises some imponderables. There are extremely few organizations or positions in the military establishment which do not need some kind of user experience. The user regards this of prime importance and demands control in order to ensure military responsiveness. By this logic, which

⁷Subcommittee Report on Special Personnel Problems in the Department of Defense, with ltr of transmittal signed by Herbert Hoover; June, 1955, p.57.

is strong logic, nearly all assignments would call for military personnel. On the other hand there is hardly a position of importance which does not suffer from the discontinuity of military turnover. Even the most hard and fast militarist would agree to this. Yet by this criterion nearly all assignments, and surely all important ones, would be made with civilian personnel. The two are not only incompatible with one another, but together are incompatible with the recommendation against double staffing. With the exception of very few and very obvious cases, such as surplus disposal or demolition of enemy installations, practically any position could fit both civilian and military criteria - surely most positions in the Pentagon and related headquarters activities and offices.

It is clear that we are no longer talking about the same civilian whom we were talking about earlier - the high level, policy-making, political appointee or Schedule C servant. Now we are talking about the professional civil servant. He is no transient. And while in many ways he 'competes' with his military colleagues for influence, positions of power and recognition, he is much closer to the problems of the military, because he has been so involved in the administration of the military departments, and in working side-by-side with numerous military officers. He feels often that he is more know-

ledgeable of departmental affairs and practices than are the host of military officers who come and go every two or three years and do not have to remain to live with the castles they build in their short moment on the beach. Often he feels that the military officer has no experience in management. He feels as though he has to rock with the seas, now working for one officer now with another. Each may have very different ideas about how things should be run. One may completely undo everything his predecessor has done, only to have his sucessor reinstate the original. He finds little solace in the idea that if his boss does not like his ideas, all he need do is bide his time and soon he will have a new one who may be more sympathetic. He feels that the important jobs all go to the military and there are hardly any 'choice jobs' to which he can look forward unless he moves to a non-military department, into agencies with which he is unfamiliar and in which other civilians have long-standing seniority.

The military officer often loses patience with the professional civil servant. He sees him as a bureaucrat dedicated to self-preservation and, except for expansion, to the status quo. Vegetation. He sees the civil servant drop his pencil at 4:30 p.m. in the middle of a sentence and rush for the parking lot, while he, the officer, works late. He sees the civil servant as one who

does not have the education he has had and not nearly the degree of management expertise he would have expected of our professional administrators. He can remember having his first command when he was 25 years old, perhaps of a small ship, company , or a large aircraft with a crew of a dozen personnel. Not long after he was 40 years old he had a larger command - perhaps of several hundred persons. In between were a number of staff jobs. In all, he feels he has as much or more management experience as the civilian. What is more, he knows that soon he will be going back to the operating forces and will have to live under the policies, plans, and directives which are presently being produced, while the civilian will remain apart from the implementation of his own designs. He is determined that those policies, plans, and directives will be, albeit imperfect, workable at the operating level. He insists upon military control of such matters, though he supports the precept of ultimate civilian control. He sees it as just that - ultimate. He does not see it as a condition at the intermediate or lower levels.

With all of this the two know that they cannot do without one another. The military officer sees in the civil servant the needed stability and continuity of administration. The civil servant sees in the officer the operational knowledge he brings with him. Again, in the

great majority of instances, they get along well and have established, though often tacit, working relationships. It is only when either is challenged publicly that conflict is certain. It is during these periods that their relations are most publicized and not during the more frequent and longer lasting periods of mutual support.

Today there is a third dimension of civilian-military relations, unlike either of the two already discussed. It is the interface between the civilian scientist and the military officer. The soaring growth of modern science and technology has caused a great need and influx of scientists into the military departments. There are, for example, nearly two PhD's in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations for every admiral.⁸ Many of these scientists work directly under military officers, frequently at higher salaries and with greater social prestige in the community.

Here, the feelings of officers vary greatly, often inversely in scientific rapport with the age and rank of the officer. The younger officer, perhaps with an advanced degree in some scientific discipline, is frequently in sympathy with the scientist. He feels as though he may have a better understanding of the interdependency of technology and warfare than some of his superiors. He

⁸See Office of the Chief of Naval Operations telephone directory, OPNAV 09B8 - P 1, Jan. 1962.

frequently goes to the scientist unofficially for advice concerning the applications of technology to military problems. If he has not learned a scientific specialty of his own, he has usually been introduced to the various disciplines enough to know that technology is an unmistakable ingredient in modern warfare. The more senior officer is usually in one of three groups. He may himself be highly scientifically trained, as one of the very few of his generation of officers, and have a keen understanding of the relationship between warfare and science. If so, he has the highest regard for his scientific colleagues, and their arguments are of the variety to be expected among mature, thinking, persons. He may not be so trained, in which case he usually stands among the loudest of pen-rattlers. He strikes out against the soft intellectual defense in favor of the old fashioned 'fastest-with-the-mostest' hardware approach, often overlooking the fact that the hardware he holds up in evidence against the scientific approach is the creation of the scientist he is indicting. He sees the scientist as an egg-head, living in an ivory tower if not a fools world. He questions the involvement in military affairs of such men who have never so much as had an eye blackened in anger.

In between is the vast population of the uncertain. They have too often seen the impossible materialize to

question too strongly the words of the scientist. At the same time they speculate on where it is all leading and how much control anyone - scientist, officer, or civilian - has over where it will all take us.

The scientist, reading these widely varying reactions, sees in the military officer all men. He, therefore, is less likely than anyone to classify military officers as a group. He treats each as an individual and behaves accordingly. But there are still predominant problems which he views as paramount to successful scientific operations in the military amphitheatre. He feels that while in many ways he is better able to carry out his scientific work in a government laboratory, he is sure that there is still too much control of scientific endeavors by lesser qualified officers. While he respects the need for user involvement, he deplores user control during the basic research and development phases.

When the scientist moves out of the laboratory into the Pentagon he sees tremendous red tape, misunderstanding of the role of the scientist in the military establishment, and a great deal of provincialism and power struggling, none of which he regards as optimal. He often feels that the military and professional civil servant make things unduly complicated, even what few simple things remain in this world. He sees them trapped in the irrelevancies of tradition, protocol, politics

and directives. He sees crisis orientation in an organization which should be mainly concerned with long range planning. He sees a handful of senior officers in whom he has great respect, and with whom he can communicate. But not nearly enough of them. He sees a greater number of junior officers who hold great promise, but who are too junior to make any real difference in times which wait for no one. He too wonders what will come of it all and if he wouldn't be better off back at Bell Labs, or MIT, or wherever it was.

Still another plane of intersection is that between the military and the civilian contractor. Many elements combine to make their relationship probably the most satisfying of them all. To begin with, the two are not in competition with one another. Their co-existence is one of mutual consent. They seek each other out for mutual benefit; the officer for improved military systems; the civilian for a contract and a part in the national defense effort. They seek out each other's advice and work closely together. Neither one of them knows any quitting time when they are on top of a problem. They usually speak the same language and complement each other's weaknesses and strong points. They often drink together. Many times the civilian has had recent experience in the military, usually as an officer. Some are graduates of service academies. The officer knows

that he can usually depend upon the civilian to produce. He likes the business arrangement and the knowledge that he can tell the contractor what he wants and get it. If he doesn't get what he wants, he knows that there will probably be a very good reason, rather than the shoulder-shrugging salute and excuses of government agencies.

When there is conflict between the officer and civilian contractor it is seldom allowed to get out of hand, usually due to the diplomacy and political acumen of the contractor. Their misgivings about one another, if they have them, are rarely exchanged. But often the civilian sees only a few officers for whom he has great respect in a whole organization. Others he sees making plays for power or sheepishly agreeing with superiors on policies which he regards as stupid, inefficient, contradictory, and potentially if not actually very costly. And he knows something about relative costs - that's how he makes his living. He regards many of his officer colleagues as politically naive and technically mediocre. He feels that, if he ever had to, he could buffalo most of them. He regards it a matter of practise to let the officer do most of the talking until he knows him better. He sees in the military many cliques and he must know who stands where and in whom he can confide. He sees officers as a group of people who are either extremely underpaid or extremely overpaid, and rarely paid what they are worth.

He must win the confidence of those who will decide on his proposal, but he is naturally attracted to the few officers he considers highly underpaid. He hopes they are one and the same. If they gain mutual confidence, and they usually do, the civilian will give his own opinion as such in addition to his company's opinion in matters where they may not be the same. The officer will speak for his superiors but will speak for himself as well. Many more tax dollars have been saved through this mechanism than will ever be known. Many are the ideas which have been injected through this relationship for systems improvements which were not always in the original bargain, nor provided for, nor always allowed, by regulations, contract law, and policy.

At the same time the officer has his misgivings too. He sometimes sees the contractor as too competitive - too willing to unjustly attack his competitors. Very often the officer has worked with those competitors and is more knowledgeable of their output and ability than is the critic. The officer sometimes sees the contractor as hungry - or intellectually dishonest - willing to do what he is told if it means more profit, even though it may not be the best thing to do from a technical point of view. He sometimes sees the contractor as patronizing and overconfident. He regards them as brilliant but in many cases naive. In their effort to gain contract

approval some contractors go too far in stating their real or imagined ability to solve military problems. The officer is sometimes suspicious of such stated ability when he may know that the problem is long standing and very much more complex than the civilian makes it out to be. In special instances he may even see the contractor as a competitor, particularly if the contractor can out-perform the officer on his own grounds, whatever they may be. This is not rare, and if the contractor does not subdue his role - even give undue credit to the officer involved - a very hard thing for a competing organization to do - he may alienate the officer and lose a valuable customer. More than one corporation has suffered from excellence.

From this discussion the reader might guess that our defense organization is composed of high school children with grammar school intellects. But we rarely hear about the normal course of business. We seldom hear about how things get done. Yet they do more than they do not. And while each of the conflicts discussed here has been played out or are being played out today, each is a gross generalization. There are nuances in between which are not even all known to the author and which certainly could not be listed. There are civil servants who do not drop their pencils at 4:30. There are officers who

drop theirs at 4:00. There are contractors who are not diplomatic at all. There are contractors who are not greedy, because they do not have to be, or because they have principles. There are good scientists who leave the government for more money, and there are highly competent contractors who take jobs as civil servants for considerably less money. There are officers who are not highly technically trained who have an uncanny understanding of the techno-military interface. There also are scientists who are politically motivated.

More than anything else said here, there are arguments which are real arguments and honest disagreements which are not wholly of selfish origin. There are people - most of them - whose motivations are irreproachable. The greatest portion of the time the greatest number of people work together and do what needs to be done. The notion that because an enterprise is the biggest in the world, employs the greatest number of people, has many times the budget of the next largest, and is by far one of the most important enterprises in the world - the notion that because of these things we should, at far below standard salaries, have nothing but the absolutely best talent possible throughout, is sheer nonsense. No matter how one cuts the parts up, there are still only 10% of the people who are better than 90% of the people. And they are not all in the military nor in the civil service. Nor are they always appointed to executive

positions. Nor are they all in industry. Talent is a very scarce national resource. All is not well, but all is not as chaotic as some would have us believe.

As long as we recognize the need for military experience and civilian control at the higher levels; and military experience and continuity throughout; and we recognize these things simultaneously; then we must commit ourselves to a policy of civilian-military co-existence, and to a great deal of dual staffing. This may not be the cheapest way to run a railroad, but it is the only assurance we have of keeping the trains on schedule.

The price of running a defense organization is extremely high anywhere. You cannot capitalize destroyers, tanks, or jet bombers. There is no profit motivation, but there is a great fear of losing which makes us want to play it safe - to hedge our bets with a little extra. And the price of military-civilian co-existence is high in terms other than simply dollars. High level disagreements, publicly acknowledged and followed like the Friday night fights, take a great toll in terms of confidence and morale in the officer corps and throughout the defense organization. The consequences are felt throughout industry and the nation-body as a whole. No one would trade this price in for freedom of the press, but neither can we afford to overlook these costs altogether.

What are the alternatives? One is an all civilian Defense Department. Civilian officials would be the first

to squelch any such plan as completely irresponsible to military considerations. Another would be a Defense Department with civilian officials in all important positions throughout, each with a military advisor. This would cost a price in terms of military effectiveness which would be extremely difficult to recover. Even the man on the street would rather have the best defense and pay more, than have the most efficient government with a second best defense. The margin of error is very fine and it is better to be slightly over the green side than slightly over the red.

It is of course possible to have an organization, as in part we do now, in which the offices of the Secretaries are predominantly civilian with military advisors and the military departments are mainly military with civilian assistants for the sake of continuity; and at the same time follow a policy of no public disagreement. In this case the high level officer disagreeing with the civilian official would not be permitted to speak out. The price here would be very high indeed, and soon there would be extremely few if any outstanding individuals who would be attracted to a military career.

We could assign military officers to our Secretarial positions. This ^{would be} so out of character for our society that, even if it could work, it would never gain acceptance, least of all in the officer corps, which is all

too aware of the hazardous potentiality of politically motivated military bodies such as it has seen and known in other countries.

The price of the system of 'conflict' is high, but it is not as high as it seems, relative to the alternative systems. Furthermore, we understand it. It is as much a part of American Government as is the Presidential Veto, the Congressional investigation, and the Supreme Court. And it serves an equally important role.

This is not to say that improvements and reforms cannot be made and should not be made. We must provide the organization necessary to permit military responsiveness, both military and civilian management training, a better mutual understanding, and ultimate civilian control. This we can do through an organization pattern similar to that shown in Figure 5.

The system of 'conflict' is not peculiar to the American form of government. Is not a house specialty of the Pentagon. It is, in fact, the mainstay of any unwarlike government. Air Vice Marshal Kingston-McCloughry stated it thusly:

As long as there is a boundary between the political and military authority, and this is an essential feature of a democracy, any so-called perfect Whitehall machine is impossible.⁹

⁹ Kingston-McCloughry, Air Vice Marshal E.J., Defense, Policy and Strategy, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, N.Y., 1960. p.109.

PROPOSED CIVILIAN-MILITARY DEFENSE ORGANIZATION




Figure 5.5

This is more than the old-standing bilinear system. It is a means whereby individual and organizational growth can be effectively planned. The civilian assistants and aides on the military side of the house today would be the source of civilian executive power on the right side of the house tomorrow. The military assistants and aides on the right side today would be the prospective military executives of tomorrow. Each major official would have his own 'interpreter'. Each would have been introduced to the others problems and outlook. Each would know at least some of his opposite numbers on a personal basis, a point frequently disregarded. And there would be no doubt about who was in charge of either side of the organization. There would be no competition, for example, for control of the management and administrative services organization in the military organization. It would be clearly a military job with a civilian assistant and junior civilian aide. Similarly, there would be no argument over whether the comptroller position on the right side should be filled by a civilian or military officer. It would be clearly a civilian position with a military assistant, and perhaps a junior officer aide. If there was to be any argument it would be of the order, "on which side of the house should the comptroller appear?" If this could not be mutually agreed by both sides, as in most cases it probably could, the issue would then be presented to the Secretary by members of

the Advisory Group for a final determination. Such an organization would work not only within the individual military departments, but in the office of the Secretary of Defense as well. It would provide long term growth patterns for civilian and officer alike. The civilian could see the potential of a career in defense, one which need not end in a capacity subservient to a military officer. It would provide an attraction for talent, be conducive to a better mutual understanding, and most important of all would ensure maximum military responsiveness within the framework of ultimate civilian control. It would permit regular turnover of military officers to keep the organization operationally oriented while providing continuity through civilians. It would be in complete contradiction of the quoted recommendations of the Hoover Commission.

There is no perfect Pentagon machine which is not from time to time in need of oiling. But the squeaks must be heard. And all the preventative maintenance in the world will not completely eliminate the chance of a system breakdown. If we knew how to tool parts that well, we'd be well beyond the stage of needing such a machine. Clearly we're not.

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II

DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND NATIONAL COMMAND:

SOME HISTORICAL NOTES

Prior to 1798 naval affairs (there were no ships) were handled with Army affairs, as were for that matter Interior affairs, under a single department of the government, the War Department. It was largely due to President Adams' dissatisfaction with the handling of naval matters that a separate Department of the Navy was established in that year. Until 1898, with the acquisition of overseas territories, there was little attention given to reconsiderations of unification of the Army and Navy. According to Stanley, the Joint Board was created in 1903. On April 23, 1927, the Secretaries of War and the Navy jointly promulgated the pamphlet, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, superseding and rescinding their previous "Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense". These were the forerunners of today's JCS Pub. 2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). The 1927 publication states:

The authority for the Joint Board is published in War Department G.O. No. 94, 1919, as amended by G.O. No. 29, 1927, and Navy Department G.O. No. 491, 1919, as amended by G.O. No. 162, 1927. The board consists....of the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, General Staff; and ...the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Director, War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations,....with a secretary

detailed from the personnel of either...Department.¹⁰

But there was still no statutory description of the Board:

The existing joint agencies for coordination between the Army and the Navy have no legislative nor executive basis for existence. These agencies exist as a result of agreement between the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments. The recommendations of these joint agencies are advisory only, become effective upon approval by both Secretaries, and in some cases upon further approval by the President.¹¹

In June, 1928, the Army and Navy Munitions Board was established, consisting of the "Assistant Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, assisted by ten committees, together with many subcommittees composed of officers on duty with the War and Navy Departments."¹² The Board coordinated planning for acquisition of supplies and munitions "for war purposes or to meet the needs of any joint plan...also...evolving a suitable legislative program which will enable the procurement program to be put into effect."¹³

In 1927 the Aeronautical Board was established "to prevent duplication of effort and to secure...coordination in the development and employment of the Army Air Corps and Naval Aviation."¹⁴ (The author wonders if any of the original members of this Board lived to witness the recent TFX controversy.)

¹⁰Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, Prepared by the Joint Board, USGPO Wash., D.C., 1927, Chapter XI, p.1.

¹¹Ibid. ¹²Ibid., Chapter XI, p.3.

¹³Ibid. ¹⁴Ibid.,

Provisions were included in the 1927 document for appointment of "unity of command" commanders by the President for joint operations.¹⁵ The Joint Board became inactive in World War II, apparently due to its peacetime orientation, and was succeeded by the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in action resulting from the Arcadia Conference which will be discussed later. The JCS, with co-equal membership, consisted of the Army and Navy Service Chiefs and the Commanding General of the Army Air Force, and subsequently, for Marine matters, the Commandant of Marine Corps. (The Army Air Force was actually created on March 9, 1942. Not only as a result of a long struggle for more independence of air forces and the shock of entering the war, but also to align our JCS along the lines of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee). They retained force support and operational control of their respective forces, with the exception of the first three months of the war when the positions of Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (CICUSF) and JC were held by different officers, Admiral King and Stark. The JCS soon began to function as the 'corporate body' of American military leadership.

During the period 1931-1947, mainly by proponents of more autonomy for air force, legislation was proposed by the House and Senate of every Congress from the 67th to the 76th, for the unification of the services in a single

¹⁵Ibid., Chapter VII, p. 8.

department. In fact, in 1931 such legislation (H.R. 13458; 72nd Congress), was defeated on the House Floor 153 to 135 - a mere 18 votes.¹⁶

The deciding blow in favor of such legislation was struck by President Truman on December 19, 1945, when in a message to Congress he said:

The President as Commander in Chief, should not personally have to coordinate the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. With all the other problems before him, the President cannot be expected to balance the several branches of the national defense. He should be able to rely for that coordination at the Cabinet level.¹⁷

In a year and a half it was law - not exactly as Truman had wanted it, but it was only a matter of time.

In addition to creating the National Security Council, presumably giving the military services a greater part to play in determining national policy; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to coordinate the intelligence efforts of the military services and other government agencies; and the National Security Resources Board; the National Security Act of 1947 was the first significant measure of service unification since the establishment of the Department of the Navy as a separate department in 1798. It also established the Department of the Air Force as a separate executive department.

¹⁶ Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security; a report to Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, by Ferdinand Eberstadt, et al; Senate Committee on Naval Affairs Print, U.S.G.P.O., Oct. 22, 1945, p.243.

¹⁷ Quoted in Stanley, Op. Cit., p.76.

The Act established the three military services as part of a National Military Establishment, for which a Secretary of Defense was provided. The three services remained executive departments and their Secretaries continued to enjoy Cabinet status. This provision was to be the subject of later controversies, when, after appointment of James V. Forrestal as the first Secretary of Defense, considerable confusion arose as to his status with regard to the Service Secretaries. He was forced to operate mainly in a coordinative capacity and primarily by persuasion.

In the years to come, the authority of the Secretary of Defense (SecDEF) was to become a fundamental issue. In nearly all instances of subsequent defense legislation, the President was to request more centralization of power in the office of the Secretary of Defense, and less for the Service Secretaries. That too was only a matter of time.

Something else happened in 1947, almost without notice, but not without significance. On January 1, the Manhattan Project was established as the Armed Forces Special Weapons Command. It was the forerunner of the unified Defense agencies, and is today known as the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA).

Today it is an organization of over 7000 people, and while it is not immediately under SecDEF, as is the Defense Supply Agency, neither is it under the Joint Staff.

Like its latter-day sister agencies, the Defense Communication (DCA) and Intelligence (DIA) agencies, it is immediately responsible to the JCS. But DASA relations with the J-Staff have been very close, though sometimes strained. This has had a considerable influence on the authority, size and effectiveness of the JCS and J-Staff. For DASA also works closely with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). This has, for example, given the JCS the direct ear of the AEC where pressure could be brought to bear in favor of military recommendation with regard to nuclear weapons. Since DASA has supporting functions to the JCS and the J-Staff, it has also increased the effective size of the Joint Staff considerably, although this is not usually considered. It is difficult to judge what might have happened if DASA had been in CSD proper, but it is safe to say that its placement under the JCS greatly strengthened the JCS and J-Staff position.

The JCS met in Key West in March 1948, to determine service roles and discuss such sensitive matters as naval aviation. Broad missions and roles (air, land, sea operations...) were forthcoming, but little agreement could be reached on other important matters (e.g. the strategic value of the flush-deck carrier).¹⁸ The Key West agreement had very little effect on the status quo. If anything, it may

¹⁸Hammond, Paul Y., Organizing for Defense, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N.J., 1961, p.374.

have had negative results when Generals Spaatz and Norstad indicated their agreement was only in the interpretation of the Act of 1947 with which they disagreed in principle: it was apparent that the 'agreement' was worthless. Inter-service "bickering" was evident, and this added fuel to the fire of those who sought greater control and centralization from above. It was not long in coming. The agreement did not specifically give the general direction of all combat operations to the JCS. (The 1953 revisions to the agreement added as a function of the JCS; "including guidance for the operational control of forces and for the conduct of combat operations".¹⁹) Primary functions of the services were further listed and clarified later in 1948 at the Newport Conference.

The 1949 Amendments to the Act of 1947, based largely on Hoover Commission recommendations, changed the name of the National Military Establishment to the Department of Defense (DoD). This was more than an attempt at alliteration. They stated once and for all that legislation pertaining to powers of heads of executive agencies did indeed apply to SECDEF, greatly strengthening his position and status. His powers were considerably strengthened. A Deputy Secretary's position was created and the three Special Assistants were re-designated Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ASD), one of whom was to be the Comptroller

¹⁹ Stanley, Op. Cit., p. 180.

of the Defense Department. Although it was provided that the military departments would be separately administered by the Service Secretaries, they were placed distinctly under the direction, authority, and control (commonly called "DAC" powers) of the Secretary of Defense. The service secretaries lost their position as Cabinet members. The SECDEF's power to transfer, reassign, abolish and consolidate functions of the services ("TRAC" powers) were clarified. He was not to have TRAC powers in matters concerning combatant functions. Use of these powers elsewhere was prohibited without first reporting to the Committees on Armed Services of the Congress. SECDEF was enjoined against merging the services or establishing a single chief of staff or armed forces general staff.

The 1949 Amendments created the non-voting position of chairman of the JCS who would not exercise military command. Again Congress expressed its traditional view that there must be a safety valve for disagreement among military departments, providing for a free statement of minority opinion and a healthy degree of competition. The right and responsibility of military men to speak frankly to Congress was reaffirmed. Some of those who remember suggest that certain believers in the tradition of separate military services did so on the hypotheses that the only certain way of avoiding dangerous centralization of military power, was to keep them at each other's throats. And when, in the mind of the public or Congress

they were at one another's throat, the cry for more power for the Secretary of Defense sounded more reasonable. So it was in the amendments, along with the calls for civilian control, that considerably more power was given to the Secretary of Defense, making him, for example, the sole defense representative in the National Security Council (NSC) and in the Cabinet. By the same legislation the War Council was changed to the Armed Forces Policy Council, and the Joint Staff was increased from 100 to 210 officers.

Title IV of the Act, "Promotion of Economy and Efficiency Through establishment of Uniform Budgetary and Fiscal Procedures and Organizations," added a Comptroller to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and to each of the military departments, and generally provided the first steps in a revolutionary chain of financial management events which was to culminate in 1961 with the institution of the Program Change Control System throughout DoD.

On April 30, 1953, Reorganization Plan No. 6 was passed by Congress. It abolished the Munition Board, R&D Board, and the Defense Supply Management Agency, transferring the functions to SECDEF.

Six additional ASD's and a General Counsel were authorized, greatly increasing the staff of OSD and the Secretary's span of control. It provided the Secretary with a "counter-force" of civilian experts within his own

staff. They had solely staff functions by law.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, above all other things, removed all doubts as to the authority of the SECDEF. It is doubtful if anyone in our government, with the exception of the President and the captain of a ship, has ever been given more freedom of action. Subject in certain cases to Congressional veto, it gave SECDEF power to transfer, abolish or consolidate non-combatant functions. The Act established the Director and Office of Defense Research and Engineering (ODD&E), removed operational control of nearly all operating forces from the military departments and placed this control in the hands of the commanders of the unified and specified commands. The chain of command was now from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified commands, through the JCS.

The Act provided means whereby the ASD's may in certain cases issue directives to the military departments, while reducing the number of Service Assistant Secretaries from four to three. In short, it further increased control of the military departments and forces at the SECDEF and OSD levels. It might more accurately be described this way: before 1958, we thought of SECDEF as 'The Next Level'. Now it was clear that there was to be a new level in between - OSD - for all practical purposes.

The years 1961-1962 saw the results of powers given to the SECDEF in the 1958 legislation. There was created

an ASD (Civil Defense) and two ASD's were merged into one for Manpower, two others into Installations and Logistics. The Deputy Director ODR&L was elevated to the position of an ASD, placing the Director above all ASD's. The Office of Programming was established under the ASD(Comptroller) and the Program Package System, now known as the Program Change Control System, of budget formulation and review was initiated. The Office of Organizational and Management Planning Studies was created under the General Counsel and the functions of the Policy Planning staff under ASD (International Security Affairs) was expanded.

The Defense Supply Agency was established, the only super-agency not organizationally under the JCS. With this, greater emphasis was placed on standard procedures, e.g., MILSTRIP, MILSTAMP, etc. DIA was established under the JCS, stripping the service intelligence efforts in many important areas, not the least of which was the budgetary area. For the service intelligence agencies it was the beginning of the end. In fact, it was later than that.†

The functions of the Under Secretaries and the Assistant Secretaries of the military departments for financial management, R&D, and installations and logistics were standardized. A ninth command, U.S. Strike Command, was established as a unified command, combining the Army's Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) and the Air Force's Tactical Air Command (TAC).

†This assertion does not apply to all aspects of intelligence, some of which were already unified and certain of which remain intact. They cannot be discussed here.

DCA received greater responsibilities. The planning for the National Military Command Center was removed from the J-Staff by Secretary McNamara and assigned to DCA - to report to ODR&E on a 'copy to' basis with the J-Staff. ODR&E played strongly in this development. And for those who didn't already know, ODR&E was in the game for keeps. They saw to it that they had the talent to stay in.

As significant as all of these things were, it is difficult to find a more important event than the assignment of operational control of the Cuban Quarantine forces to CMC, albeit in his capacity as Navy Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (That is a subtle but definite and important distinction.) It showed the JCS system was still pliable. It was not so involved in SCP that special handling could not be quickly and efficiently arranged. This is strong evidence against the claim that the JCS and J-Staff are bogged down.

III

THE ENDURING DEBATE JOINT VS. GENERAL STAFF

For years many military officers and critics have claimed that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff system should be replaced by a General Staff. The claims are that the dissention in the JCS system would be eliminated, or considerably lessened; that our staff reaction time would be quickened; that the Armed Forces would speak with one voice. Our Army and Air Force, it is reasoned, have traditionally been established as General Staffs. Why, then should not the direction of our Armed Forces together be accomplished through a General Staff of the Armed Forces with a Supreme Commander?

The proponents of the General Staff system have come primarily from the ranks of the Army and Air Force, while proponents of the Joints Chiefs system have been mostly admirals, Congressmen and other civilians. The difference between the two systems is often not acknowledged and frequently misunderstood.

Leishline,²⁰ in outlining the history of the General Staff system tells us how it came into existence in the seventeenth century, referring then simply to the general officers of the army. The General Staff system was de-

²⁰ Leishline, John Robert, Ph.D., Colonel, General Staff Corps, USA, Military Management for National Defense, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood, N.J., 1961, p.17.

veloped by Frederick the Great of Prussia and Pierre de Bourcet of France following the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) - Frederick in his history of the war, and Bourcet in his Principles de la Guerre de Montagnes. It was not, however, until after the defeat of the Prussian Army at Jena in 1806 that Gerhard Johann Scharnhorst began the reformation of the Prussian Army with the assistance of a Captain von Clausewitz. One of the policies prescribed by Scharnhorst was that staff officers should rotate back to the troops from time to time, in order to keep planning on a realistic basis and to avoid a clique of staff officers. This is the basis of the present U.S. Navy's strictly-adhered-to sea-duty/shore-duty rotation system. It is a policy which is considered of a great deal less importance in the Army and Air Force. It is a policy which is contradictory to the specialist concept, but complementary to the subspecialist concept.

Clausewitz was the first to define 'general staff':

Scharnhorst's protégé, General von Clausewitz (1780-1831), did much to implement the Scharnhorst principles and also preserved them for posterity through his military masterpiece, On War. Clausewitz conceived that "the General Staff is intended to convert the ideas of the commanding general into orders, not only conveying the former to the troops, but also working out all matters of detail, thus relieving the general from a great amount of trouble." This embodies the principle that the General Staff is the commander's alter ego. It remained for Count von Moltke, as the Prussian Chief of the General Staff in the Franco-Prussian War, to give practical application to the principles of Scharnhorst and von Clausewitz. Thus the General Staff

concept as it exists in modern military organization came into permanent being.²¹

In 1902, Secretary of War Elihu Root made a monumental bid for an Army General Staff. In The Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the Year 1902 he wrote:

The most important thing to be done now for the regular Army is the creation of a general staff....

Our military system is... still exceedingly defective at the top....

It is easy for the President, or a general acting under his direction, to order that 50,000 or 100,000 men proceed to Cuba and capture Havana. To make an order which has any reasonable chance of being executed he must do a great deal more than that. He must determine how many men shall be sent and how they shall be divided among the different arms of the service. He must get all the information possible about the details of the place to be captured and the strength and character... of the forces to be met. He must determine... at what points his troops shall land in Cuba... the various harbors... the depths of their channels... the facilities for landing... the intervening country... the climate... the temper and sympathies of the inhabitants...

All this information it is the business of the general staff to procure and present. It is probable that there would be... a number of alternative plans... and these should be worked out each by itself with the reason for and against it, and presented to the President or general for his determination... then at home... the order must be based upon a knowledge of the men and material available for its execution...

It was the lack of such a body of men doing that kind of work which led to the confusion attending the Santiago expedition in the summer of 1898. Such a body of men doing general staff duty is just as necessary to prepare an army properly for war in time of peace as it is in time of war. It is not an executive body; it is not an administrative body; it acts only through the authority of others. It makes intelligent and effective execution of commands possible by keeping all the separate agents advised of the parts they are to play in the general scheme.

²¹Ibid., p. 18.

²²Little, J.D., Brigadier General (USC, Ret.). The Military Staff, Its History and Development. The Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1961, pp. 201-202. Emphasis supplied.

On February 14, the year following Root's appeal, Congress enacted legislation establishing an Army General Staff. Section 2 of the law was almost a carbon copy of the general staff functions described in Duties of the General Staff, by General Paul Bronsart von Schellendorf. This is especially interesting since Schellendorf, recall, was in the late nineteenth century the head of the operations section of the Prussian General Staff, who had struggled for the independence of the General Staff. The elder Moltke was the first Chief of Staff to really put the theories of Scharnhorst, as formalized by Clausewitz in On War, into practice. It was Moltke's deputy and successor, Waldersee, who obtained freedom to speak to the Emperor without consulting or even informing the War Minister, and who arranged for the appointment of Schellendorf as the Minister of War. It was this kind of militarism which had been so refined by the Prussians and used as the model for nearly all western armies, including the American Army, which caused alarm and distrust in a very non-militaristic United States.

It was not, however, the idea of the General Staff as described by Secretary Root which was met with great resistance. It is generally accepted that military organizations need some kind of planning staff. The bone of contention has been the idea of a Supreme Commander as Chief of Staff. Root passed over this very lightly, but

when he said that plans should be "presented to the President or general for his determination" (emphasis supplied) he was touching on the real heart of the matter, which was not to become the truly explosive matter until World War I and after.

It can be seen why Americans particularly abhor the idea of a General Staff with a single chief, even when they do not understand what a General Staff is. They have the image of a General von Seeckt or Von Fritsch, complete with monocle and mustache, plotting world domination and their worries are not unfounded when they consider the history of the German Great General Staff, probably the finest honed instrument of war which was ever fashioned.

It is to this kind of fear which Congress has historically addressed itself. In the National Defense Act of 1916 it was stated that the General Staff Corps "shall not be permitted to assume or engage in work of an administrative nature that pertains to established bureaus or offices of the War Department".²³ The language was to become more explicit in the years to follow.

Except for a very brief period after the establishment of the Navy General Board in 1909 under Secretary of the Navy Truman Newberry, the Navy has not had a General Staff. In fact it was the creation of the General Board, close on the heels of the Army General Staff which led to an investigation by direction of President Theodore

²³ Beishline, Cop. Cit., p. 23.

Roosevelt. The investigation resulted in a statement of the dual role of the Secretary, the civil responsibility of procuring the resources necessary for the operating forces, and the military responsibility of employing those forces. With this, the Navy bilinear consumer-producer system was created and has remained the basis of naval organization ever since. It was further developed and strengthened by the recommendations of the 1962 Dillon Board review of Navy management.

The Navy did not, however, change the Army philosophy, and when the Department of the Air Force was created in 1947, it was established with a General Staff and Chief of Staff. Thus we have a Chief of Naval Operations for the Navy, rather than a Chief of Staff, Navy. It is more than an obstinate desire on the part of the Navy to have a different title for its chief.

The purpose of the Arcadia Conference in Washington D.C., following the American entry into World War II, and attended by Roosevelt, Churchill, the military leaders of the U.S. and the British Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC), was to make provisions for the combined prosecution of the war. The Combined Chiefs of Staff was established (which tacitly established the American Joint Chiefs of Staff) with co-equal status of all members, even the Commanding General of the Army Air Force. This was done mainly to align the JCS internally with the British

In 1943 the American Chiefs proposed "a Supreme Commander be designated at once to command all United Nations operations against Germany from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic."²⁴ The British Chiefs strongly opposed the plan, as did Churchill, who wrote in a note to Roosevelt:

5. If the two commands are merged under a Supreme Commander, the British would have available against Germany in May (1944) decidedly larger forces than the United States. It would therefore appear that the Supreme command should go to a British officer. I should be very reluctant, as head of His Majesty's Government, to place such an invidious responsibility upon a British officer. If, on the other hand, disregarding the preponderance of forces involved, the Supreme Command were given to a United States officer and he pronounced in favour of concentrating on "Overlord" irrespective of the injury done to our affairs in the Mediterranean, His Majesty's Government could not possibly agree. The Supreme Commander, British or American, would therefore be placed in an impossible position.

6. It is not seen why the present arrangement should not continue, subject to any minor improvements that can be suggested...²⁵

The American proposal was delivered on November 25 according to Churchill. It is peculiar that a proposal of such significance would not be remembered by Admiral King who was at the SEXTANT Conference in Cairo when "the proposal for one over-all Supreme Command was presented to us by the American Chiefs of Staff in a formal memo-

²⁴ Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War, Closing the Ring, Houghton Mifflin Co, Boston, 1951, p.338

²⁵ Ibid., p.339.

random. From this it was apparent that the President and American High Command felt strongly that a Supreme Commander should be appointed to command all the United Nations operations against Germany."²⁶ All that King recollected of that day was the Thanksgiving service which the British residents of Cairo had so thoughtfully arranged for the Yanks.²⁷ Nothing was mentioned in his memoirs about the Supreme Commander proposal. However, there can be no doubt about what King thought of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system after the War.

The present system which provides for joint action of three autonomous services should be retained....

That the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was effective in wartime is self evident in view of the victory that was won...in less time than even the most optimistic would have believed...the strength of the Joint Chiefs of Staff lies in the combined knowledge possessed by the members and in the "checks and balances" that tend to prevent domination by any one person. When the history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff comes to be written, their record will show how many proposals - including some of my own - had to yield to cogent reasoning of one or more members.²⁸

In his Grand Alliance, Churchill blessed the Combined Chiefs of Staff concept, which was an international extension of the Joint Staff system. Churchill's comment was made after the War during which the Combined Chiefs

²⁶Ibid., pp. 335-336.

²⁷ King, Ernest J. and Walter Muir Whitehall, Fleet Admiral King, A Naval Record, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1953, p. 303.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 436-437.

had held some 200 meetings:

However sharp the conflict of views at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings, however frank and even heated the argument, sincere loyalty to the common cause prevailed over national or personal interests. Decisions reached and approved by the heads of Governments were pursued by all with a perfect loyalty, especially by those whose original opinions had been overruled. There was never a failure to reach effective agreement for action, or to send clear instructions to the commanders in every theatre... There never was a more serviceable war machine established among allies... 29

In the U.S., it is not surprising that the major proponents of the General Staff system have come mostly ^{from the} Army and Air Force where the system has been successfully employed. It is also not surprising that the General Staff system is generally challenged by naval leaders who have operated successfully without a General Staff. Furthermore, naval officers of flag rank have been, by that time in their careers, exposed to land warfare, through operations with the Marines, and air warfare through naval air operations, in addition to sea warfare per se.

Amphibious operations, an age old specialty of the Navy, made the Navy especially aware of and interested in unified operations long before the Armed Forces were organized on a unified basis. Today, the most truly unified command (from the point of view of having large Army, Navy and Air Force committed to it), the Pacific Command, is a 'Navy sponsored' command, i.e., JWPAC is a naval of-

²⁹Nicholas, Jack D., Colonel, USA; Colonel George B. Pickett, USA; Captain William C. Spears, Jr., USN; The Joint and Combined Staff Officer's Manual, The Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, p., 1959. p. 117. Emphasis supplied

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²⁹Nicholas, Jack D., Colonel, USA; Colonel George B. Pickett, USA; Captain William O. Spears, Jr., USN; The Joint and Combined Staff Officer's Manual, The Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, p., 1959, p. 111. Emphasis supplied.

ficer whose command system is maintained by Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (a Navy component commander) and CNO. The Department of the Navy is the executive agency for support of the Pacific Command. So, whether with valid reasoning or not, it may be speculated that many senior naval officers feel that they are more sympathetic to Army and Air Force functions and objectives, than are Army and Air Force officers sympathetic to or understanding of sea power. If this speculation has any basis in fact, it is not difficult to understand why naval officers would be very hesitant to have an Army or Air Force officer in overall strategic command of the Armed Forces. Probably even more important in the naval officer's leanings is a reason similar to that of the Army and Air Force officers' i.e., the Navy has traditionally been established along bilinear lines of military and civilian control, and in this respect the Joint Staff system more closely resembles the Navy system than it does the Army or Air Force. Ostensibly, this would not appear to be the case when one sees the similarity between G-1, A-1, and J-1; G-2, A-2, and J-2; etc; but this similarity is irrelevant. The heart of naval organization is, as stated elsewhere, the establishment of naval force requirements by CNO and the fulfillment of those requirements by the bureaus. And even though the bureaus are military organizations, they are responsible to and under the executive direction of

the Secretary of the Navy. This is remarkably similar to the split function of the JCS and Secretary of Defense. The JCS determine the support requirements of the unified and specified commands and recommend the establishment and force structure of those commands to SECDEF. The Defense Supply Agency, responsible to the Secretary, in part fulfills those requirements. In many other ways the Secretary influences the fulfillment of those requirements, particularly through the Program Change Control System. In the financial area the Navy has also long been accustomed to the idea of the Navy Comptroller being a civilian executive as is the Defense Comptroller, as is not, for example, the Air Force Comptroller.

It is no less surprising that Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff Committee favor the Joint Staff system. They invented it. Many will disagree, citing the establishment of the American Joint Board in 1903 as opposed to the British origins in 1904 of the Committee on Imperial Defense and later Central Organization for Defense. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff system as we know it today had its origin in the British Chiefs of Staff Committee which was established in 1924. But the matter of insensitization is largely academic. The point is that the system had served the British long and well. And, as the U.S. Congress had gone through the General Staff debate in 1947, so had the British in 1946:

A second alternative was the creation of a combined General Staff - that is, a General Staff on the German conception, drawn from the three services. This body would formulate defense policy, issue directives, freed, it was claimed, from the service bias and tendency toward compromise which was present in the existing Joint Staff system. Having regard particularly for weaknesses revealed by a study of the German wartime General Staff, the government decided that it was unsafe in practice and sound in principle to divorce responsibility for planning from responsibility for the execution of those plans. This had proved to be one of the cardinal defects of the German system.

The British decided therefore to continue with their Chiefs of Staff Committee served by Joint Staffs. Thus the men who formulate the plans are those who have the responsibility for carrying them out in the Service Departments. This principle had been adopted in the international sphere during World War II with the creation of the combined Chiefs of Staff organization, and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff have operated on the same basis. To remedy such defects in pre-war organization as a lack of a central ministry, a Minister of Defense and a Defense Ministry were created. This gave the necessary top level authority and direction in the organization for formulating and applying unified defense policy. ...The single Ministry of Supply was adopted on July 13, 1939...of the many proposals considered in the United States for a similar system, few if any have made reference to the British counterpart...

As of 1956, the Ministry of Supply is responsible for all procurement of the Army and Air Force and certain weapons, such as guided missiles, used by the Navy. ³⁰

Though of course there are many differences, the striking resemblance between the British and American systems raises a point the author did not find anywhere discussed in his research - that is the innate value of having closely corresponding systems of defense in the U.S. and Great Britain. While the point seems elementary, and while it must have been a major underlying consideration

³⁰ Stanley; Cp Cit, pp. 146-149.

during and prior to the Arcadia Conference and the resultant establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it is a point which is apparently assumed and not considered worthy of mention in the many books on the subject and in detailed Congressional hearings concerning the advantages and disadvantages of the General and Joint Staff systems. Yet, is it a point which we can afford to regard implicitly? General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, (then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), in his foreward to The Joint and Combined Staff Officers Manual said:

The statement by President Eisenhower that separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever is one of the principle manifestations of the revolution taking place in the area of warfare...³¹

Today we have gone a step further in that revolution. While we still have our Lebanons and Cubas and other predominantly American operations, the day of any separate, large-scale, American involvement is gone forever. This too is a manifestation - not only of the revolution in the art of warfare but of the evolution of the whole politico-military environment. We have seen the Joint Staff system work in a world war on an international staff basis. There is no evidence that the Joint Staff system is not functioning well in the cold war. If this is true, and if the Joint Staff system is effective for small operations, it would seem to be a significant reason to favor retaining

³¹Nicholas, Jack D., Colonel, USAF; et al, Op Cit, foreward.

the Joint Staff system as the basis for American military behavior. The argument is further strengthened by consideration of still more complex NATO or other collective security organization combined operations. It is no more likely now that the British or other allies will look favorably upon an American Supreme Commander in any future engagement than it was on Thanksgiving in Cairo. Indeed, it seems naive to consider that the U.S. would permit an officer of any other nation to act as Supreme Commander of all allied forces including our own, without U.S. veto or other highly constraining powers. With such powers we would destroy the very element which is most commonly held up as the ultimate reason for the General Staff - unity of command. The thought that we might as a nation employ a General Staff system and simultaneously subscribe to an international Joint Staff system is inconsistent by definition and would surely prove to be so by operation.

One other point which seems conspicuous by its absence in the defense literature: the assumption that because the General Staff system works for a single military service it should work for the services jointly; that the General Staff system is another way of doing business which has universal application. General Maxwell Taylor in the 1958 Congressional hearings on Defense Reorganization stated:

Being a chief of a general staff, I find it difficult to understand really the aversion to the

term "General Staff". Business has general staffs. We have general-type staffs in the Army all the way down to the division. It is just an efficient and conventional way to group helpers to senior general. So I would hope by explanation that the principle would be accepted.³²

Since General Taylor raised the point of the General Staff system in business, it might be worthwhile to look into modern business thinking in this regard. It can readily be seen wherein the General Staff system could be very effectively employed in a large business enterprise. But the differences between the staff functions of, say, marketing and procurement can hardly be compared to the differences between naval and land operations. A corporate chairman of the board may have come up through the procurement route. And while lack of marketing experience need not get him into serious trouble, it also might get him into very serious trouble. Hayakawa explores this problem in industry in his article, "Why the Edsel Laid an Egg: Motivational Research vs. the Reality Principle."³³

Dearborn and Simon give more clinical evidence of the problem in industry which raises, very seriously, questions about the use of the General Staff system even in business. Their findings were not startling, but are nevertheless commonly overlooked. Several intermediate mana-

³²Liadaz, Frances E., CDR, USN, Defense Reorganization During the Eisenhower Administration, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Georgetown University, 1960, p.428.

³³Hayakawa, S.I.; "Why the Edsel laid an egg," from ETC.: A Review of General Semantics; Vol. XV, No. 2, Spring, 1958.

gers from the sales, production, accounting, personnel, medical and legal departments of a corporation were given the famous Harvard case study of the "Castengo Steel Co."³⁴ to study. The case is widely used in graduate management seminars in organization theory and policy. Only the names have been fictionalized in the study. The managers selected for the Dearborn and Simon study were people who were regarded as potential top management material. Each saw in the case only his own special interest problems and overlooked the others. This is the phenomenon which is known to psychologists as selective perception. Yet the real problems with Castengo were organization-wide in nature, embracing personnel, marketing, sales, R&D, costing, management and operations. They had very broad organizational policy implications.

Dearborn and Simon concluded:

We have presented data on the selective perceptions of industrial executives exposed to case material that support the hypothesis that each executive will perceive those aspects of a situation that relate specifically to the activities and goals of his department....[although they] were motivated to look at the problem from a company-wide rather than departmental view point....³⁵

³⁴Smith, George Albert and C. Roland Christensen, Policy Formulation and Administration, A Casebook of Top-Management Problems in Business, Fourth Edition, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood Ill. 1962, pp.168-190.

³⁵Dearborn, Dewitt C. and Herbert A. Simon, "Selective Perception: A Note on the Departmental Identifications of Executives". Sociometry, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 1958.

In short: you sees what you knows best, and not an awful lot more. Selective perception is a characteristic of human behavior, more apparent in some than others. It cannot, however, be legislated away.

That this fact is recognized in the modern business world is evidence in a study by the American Management Association on Top Management Committees.³⁶ A survey of 93 participating firms revealed 78 which had general management committees, 15 which had restricted committees (personnel, operations, R&D, etc.) and 66 which had both. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, Inc. was cited as one of the most prominent and experienced of companies in committee management, which, between the two concepts of General and Joint Staff systems, much more closely resembles the latter.

The study listed as Du Pont's reasons for embracing the system "(1) the strength and security of group decisions; (2) objectivity in decision making; (3) continuity of administration; (4) development of personnel."³⁷ The faults charged against the system most generally were reported as "cost of operation, irresponsibility, compromise and expediency, slowness, by-passing of established authority, and shifting of responsibility."³⁸

³⁶Lohmann, M.R.; Top Management Committees, Their Functions and Authority; AMA Research Study 48, American Management Assoc., New York, 1961.

³⁷Ibid., p.10

³⁸Ibid

The company presidents who participated in the study (it is interesting to note that the opinions and facts were gathered from persons who had a great deal to gain or lose by corporation success or failure) rated the functions of their general management committees in the following order: "(1) to formulate policy; (2) to recommend action to the president; (3) to formulate action in specific cases; (4) to coordinate action in areas of responsibility."³⁹ About half of the general management committees consisted of seven or fewer members and were not subject to veto by the chairman. In the restricted committees the functions were: "(1) to analyze information and data; (2) to formulate action in specific cases; and (3) to recommend action to the president."⁴⁰ The difference in scope between the general management and restricted committees seems about proportional to that of the JCB and various joint battle teams.

^{two}
Only/corporation presidents regarded the system as ineffective. Seven said that committee functions will be increased. Suggestions were advanced for the improvement of the system, the most important of which were: (1) the sending of agenda to members before the meeting; (2) regularly scheduled meetings; (3) a satisfactory means of arriving at decisions; and (4) reporting and filing minutes of committee action."⁴¹

³⁹Ibid

⁴⁰Ibid., p.11.

⁴¹Ibid

It is especially noteworthy of comment that the Joint Chiefs of Staff employ all four of these suggestions today, and have for years, though to what extent the third is developed or formalized for the JCS meetings themselves, the author does not know. Prior to JCS meetings, the procedures are fairly standard. In the case of the Chief of Naval Operations, he is briefed in the CNO Conference Room the day before JCS meetings. The papers to come up for consideration are briefed individually by an OPNAV staff officer. The paper is then discussed among CNO, the action officer, the DCNO and ACNO for Plans and Policy and various division directors and other interested staff officers. CNO then determines for himself whether he will vote the paper into the "red stripe" as is - approved JCS papers are red striped - or whether he will propose alternatives or a dissenting position. Usually, however, by the time of this conference, the service staffs have already ironed out differences in content and language.

The point here is not to draw a comparison between military and industrial operations, though they exist. The notion that there is nothing else in the world like military operations is a commonly held shibboleth in the services which has often caused us to fail to profit from the experiences of others outside of the services. But the point here is to challenge the statement that businesses employ the General Staff system, on the grounds

that modern corporations are having a very close look at this whole area. And although, like anything else, there have been a number of attacks on so-called "management by committee" (which would surely be viewed with disbelief in the British Chiefs of Staff Committee if not in the JCS), there are also a number of very respectable firms employing group management techniques with seeming success. Nor is this an attempt to compare management committees to the Joint Staff system, though likenesses are certainly there. Major differences are there too, over and above the obvious ones of objectives, stakes, etc. For example, 93% of the firms in the AMA study do not rotate their committee chairmanships.⁴² And while 96% of the firms decided by committee vote, the implication was that the vote need not be unanimous, as is the heart of the Joint System. That is, non-unanimous decisions go forward as such with dissenting opinions and alternative courses of action for final determination by the Secretary of Defense or President. In business, in some instances, the committee decision is final. In others the chairman has veto power.

What is pertinent, however, is the implication that large, highly competitive, cost-conscious firms have raised doubts over the ability of any one man today to grasp the entire scope of the environment which affects his organization directly at the top level, not to mention the indirect

⁴²Ibid., p.58.

influences throughout. No question has been raised at the operational level, where the world is smaller, though the restricted committees have worked favorably at the intermediate levels. But the real question has been raised at the top, where life has been infinitely more complicated by advances in transportation, communication, automation, and technology in general. This raises the point that what may be good at the bottom or even the middle of an organizational chart may be obsolete at the top.

It also poses the interesting question of generalist vs. subspecialist vs. specialist background as the most suitable for top management or command.

The notion that the success of the General Staff in the Army and Air Force is evidence of the system's usefulness in joint matters is especially without merit or proof. The association between strategic bombing and infantry operations is exceedingly remote to say the least, when compared, say, to the relation between infantry and artillery operations. Yet the General Staff would have, at one time or another - not simultaneously - strategic bombing experts and infantry experts as Supreme Commanders, deciding issues of vital importance to the other. Not only may the individual fail to decide in favor of the other, or even to the benefit of everyone, but he may very well fail to understand the vitalness of particular decisions outside of his own sphere of experience. This

could result in severe outcomes.

There is a good deal of talk about 'unity of command' in these discussions. Nicholas, Pickett and Spears state that this and Service viewpoint (seemingly mutually exclusive considerations) are the two major unresolved wartime problems of the JCS system.⁴³ Where is the documentary evidence to support this viewpoint relative to the wartime conduct of the JCS and Combined Chiefs? The principals in the drama did not reveal any serious breakdown during the war. And there is, as has been cited elsewhere, some rather authoritative evidence to the contrary, from the persons of King and Churchill, for example. These are people who ought to know! Nor have there been any strong arguments in support of the thesis that unity of command can only be compatible with singularity of person. There is no evidence that a group of individuals working as a corporate body, as does the JCS, cannot work under the principle of unity of command. What is needed is a common understanding of the JCS as the corporate body it is. The term 'Joint Chiefs of Staff' must be regarded as a singular proper noun, not as a plural one, if the concept under which it operates is to be understood.

The principle of 'unity-of-command' was formally introduced by the French management theorist of the principles school, Henri Fayol, in his General and Industrial

⁴³Nicholas, et al, Op Cit., pp.11-15.

management (first published in French in 1916, in English in 1949). Other principles came from the same movement - the scalar principle, better known in the military as the chain of command; and the principle of span of control. The latter is also pertinent to this discussion.

For years we have considered span of control as the principle that there is a limit to the number of people one person can effectively supervise. Some theorists, such as Graicunas,⁴⁴ say outright that five or eight is the magic number.

I suggest that there is a new principle now, which might be termed the 'span of information' or 'span of environment' principle. And that is this: for high command or top management officials, there is a limit to the amount of information and the scope of environment that any one person can absorb - even that information or environment which directly influences his position or role - and that it varies with the individual. This is especially true in the defense organization at a time when so-called 'non-military actions' have taken on such far-reaching military implications, and where the cost of error is grim to contemplate.

In the end, of course, someone must have the final power of decision, the final responsibility, unless all decisions are to be voted on. For us it can be no one but

⁴⁴Haynes, W. Warren and Joseph L. Massie; Management Analysis, Concept and Cases, Prentice Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961, pp. 40-41.

the President, for it is he who is finally responsible, by law and tradition. It is in him that final unity of command is attained. It is he if anyone who must act as the Supreme Commander. It is his Secretary of Defense who acts as his Deputy. It is the JCS who are his principal military advisors. This is a far cry from the German Great General Staff or any other General Staff. Military officers understand the principle of authority being commensurate with responsibility. The same persons should be first to understand the responsibility which is the President's, and the subsequent need for close control of the authority which goes with that responsibility. The President is also human and more subject to the tremendous span of environment and information than anyone else. He must depend upon the integrity of his civilian and military assistants and advisors to solve as many of the problems and make as many of the decisions as possible, taking to him only those problems which they cannot solve, or which he desires to pass on personally. When they do come to him he must be told the alternatives and their perceived consequences. There is less time for triviality in the White House each year. Only the hard problems must find their way there. Some hard ones will be solved at the JCS or SECDEF levels, but they will enjoy also the luxury of an occasional easy one. That luxury is becoming more and more remote to the President.

But the President cannot rely solely on the integrity of the men working for him. There is too much at stake. He must incorporate control systems - checks and balances - so that no Secretary, no Chief of Staff, can, through sickness of mind or soul, or dimness of wit, place the nation on the brink of disaster. (r over.

It is an especially difficult thing for a military officer to think in terms of committee, or group, or corporate-body decision-making, particularly at the pinnacle of his career. He has been trained for personal command and responsibility all of his mature life. It is the essence of the military profession. But there is in fact no proof whatever that the principle of single command (as opposed to corporate body command) is pertinent at the very top of our military organization by virtue of the fact that it is pertinent everywhere else. And while the General Staff may work perfectly at the division level, or the Army level, or even the headquarters level, it does not follow automatically that it will suffice at the joint level. The differences between command and control are not all insignificant; and the quantum leap in the span of information and environment, and the broadening of the value set base, do not represent the least of these.

Commander Biadasz, in her brilliant dissertation defines the differences between the Joint and General Staff system thusly:

The difference between an Overall Armed Forces General Staff system and a Joint Chiefs of Staff system lies essentially in the decision making process. It does not matter whether the pick and shovel substructure is divided into components which are assigned numbers or colors, or whether these components each deal with special functional aspects of a military problem such as personnel, logistics, intelligence etc. or whether they are organized in teams to treat a problem as a whole...The essential difference does not lie there.

The difference lies in: (1) the way the organization serves the civilian decision making process; (2) who stands at its apex.

.....
If the chief of state always receives out one single recommendation on each military matter to which his decision making power may apply only a "yes" or a "no", his military advisors are the Supreme Chief of Staff and Overall Armed Forces General Staff. If, at times, he receives not one single recommendation out two or more, if he is offered alternatives with arguments supporting each, and he must choose between or among them, his military advisors operate under the Joint Chiefs of Staff system.

.....
In other words, the difference lies in: (1) whether the organization which recommends military policy and strategy to the civilian superiors speaks with one voice, or whether, on occasion, it can speak with several; (2) whether at the top of this advisory body there is one supreme military officer or whether there are several, all, or all but one, of whom is the responsible head of his own military service.

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff system has at its apex four co-equal officers and sometimes five...including the Chairman who may come from any one of the armed services but who may not exercise command over the Joint Chiefs or over any of the armed forces...The organization is, as its name states, a Joint Chiefs organization.⁴⁵

alter Millis, in his preface to the Battershaw translation of Walter Goerlitz's History of the German General Staff 1657-1945, said this about the German General Staff:

To two generations of Americans the German General

⁴⁵Biadasz: (p. Cit., pp. 351-353.

Staff has stood as an object of hatred, fear and revulsion. In the two greatest of our wars Germany was our principal opponent; twice in a lifetime we have seen our normal world, if not our national existence itself, imperilled by her formidable and ruthless armies. Through the whole thirty years from 1914 to 1945 we were to live more or less under the shadow of the grimly expert, professional militarism by which these armies were led - a tradition nurtured and in the world's eyes personified, by the German Great General Staff.

.....
The Great General Staff is dead, and no one can say that its answers to the central problems of military organizations and command in a democratic-capitalistic society were the sound ones. But we can certainly profit by its example.⁴⁶

We have seen both systems on a national scale in modern times. The Joint system was also tested on an international scale. One system contributed to the loss of two world wars and styled its own annihilation. Through the other those wars were won. That is not to say that we mightn't have won the wars even if we had had a General Staff of our own. But it is to say that the nation which had so finely honed the General Staff as an instrument of war - the nation which developed its potential beyond all others - did not win. Twice, when it counted, the system failed. And when it comes to war, winning is (or has been) considered the universal measurement of success.

Our Joint Chiefs of Staff, or Joint Staff, system

⁴⁶Goerlitz, Walter; History of the German General Staff 1857-1945, trans. by Brian Battershaw; intro. by Walter Millis, Frederick A. Prager, 1959, pp. v-x.

is imperfect. So for that matter is our way of government. And so my friends are we all, especially as individuals. And this acknowledgement is the very cornerstone of any perception of the Joint Staff concept. Because it is designed around this fact of life.

IV

BLUEPRINTS FOR DEFENSE: SOME DESIGN CRITERIA

The degree of effectiveness of U.S. defense may be regarded as a measure of effectiveness of the National Command Participants, i.e., the President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as other government officials and advisers as the President may deem desirable (such as, today, McGeorge Bundy and Robert Kennedy). This at least is true in the long run and during periods of crisis, for the National Command Participants, whether known as the National Security Council, the Executive Committee (or EXCOM), or by any other name, meet only periodically and during periods of crisis. There is, however, another body which I call the American National High Command - the President, SECDEF and JCS - which formulates and oversees national defense policy and strategy on a day-to-day basis, though not necessarily together. It is this body which has been the subject of the present study.

The author must confess that he set out on this study with predispositions that the National High Command should include, as the military high command, a General Staff with a military Supreme Commander of the

Armed Forces. I have proved to myself that I was wrong. The United States has in the Joint Staff system a sound organization for the formulation of defense policy and strategy. It is a system geared for, and tested in, large ^{scale} and small/warfare. It retains the valuable input of the individual military services while maintaining civilian control. It forces involvement of the civilian leaders who are designated by law as responsible for national defense. It recognizes both the failings and limitations of human beings as well as their strengths. It recognizes the inseparability of the planning and execution of national strategy. It recognizes the complexity of our modern environment and the principle of the span of information. It acknowledges the need for a system which will be effective for combined as well as U.S. military operations. Moreover, it works.

The Joint Staff system should be retained. It can be improved through closer contact among the service chiefs and SECDEF. This means that the number-two officers of the military departments must play greater parts in the management of their respective departments, freeing the chiefs of the departments for a more active role in the JCS. At the same time the JCS must not become isolated from their own departments, since this is a cornerstone of the JCS structure.

The JCS must brief together, daily, with SECDEF in the National Military Command Center.

We must improve our alert provisions. We require our operational forces to be on alert times measured in minutes. Yet it has frequently taken our high command staffs several hours to respond to Presidential queries. Every means of human, technological, and organizational improvement must be bent toward improving high command - both civilian and military - and staff reaction time, so that the quick reaction time of our forces can be meaningful.

There are many improvements which can be made to the present system and in the interest of better civilian-military relationships. A few have been suggested here. But we should not be deceived into thinking, because the system needs improvement, that it is fundamentally no good, or that what problems we have today would go away or be lessened with a General Staff system.

I have only introduced one level of the problem - the National High Command. We need badly to study adjacent levels. In particular, we need to study the implications of the National Command Participant structure. With some Presidents it has been the Cabinet. With others it has been the National Security Council. Now we have such a body which is less formally structured. We need to study this in terms of continuity of defense from one President to the next, in terms of the dangers inherent in minimizing the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in

terms of what effects it may have on the role of the Cabinet and the National Security Council in defense or associated matters.

We need to study the organization of the military departments, particularly the Navy Department. It may well be that we have already passed the state of techno-politico-military existence in which our present organizations are relevant. It may well be, for example, that the time has arrived at which we should extend the Joint Staff system to the military departments. Consider the possibility of the Joint Staff system in the Navy. The CNO would be roughly to the Navy what the Chairman of the JCS is to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He would retain his status as Navy Member of the JCS and principal Naval adviser to the President, SECDEF, and NSC. The membership of the 'Navy Chiefs of Staff' would consist of a naval surface officer, a naval aviator, a submariner and a Marine. The body, or Naval High Command, would, on a co-equal basis, formulate naval force structure requirements, strategy and policy. Differences which could not be reconciled by the Navy Chiefs would be presented to the Secretary of the Navy for determination. Such an organization might not only ensure a proper balance of naval forces in the years to come, but would clarify and strengthen the role of SECNAV without destroying naval leadership from the officer corps.

No one can say that such a plan could work, or that,

even if it could, it would be an improvement of the present system. But we cannot overlook the possibilities of improving our lot. We cannot rest on tradition alone.

The Joint Staff system is sound for many other reasons than that it is traditional in our government. That is a point we must never forget, at least until such time as it is shown to be no longer true.

As we study these levels - those of the Military Departments, the National High Command, and the National Command Participants - we must be prepared for the painful as well as the happy findings. Military and civilians alike may find that their roles differ radically from their preconceived notions and traditions. Both may have to bend to form the best national defense mold.

Whatever we find - whatever we decide - one thing seems to stand out as a guiding principle: We can never again be deceived by the notion of different peacetime and wartime high command organizations. In some irony we might recall the words of General Carl von Clausewitz:

"If a cautious commander tries...to twist himself skillfully into a peace through the characteristic weakness of his enemy in the field and in the Cabinet, we have no right to find fault with him... still we must require him to remember that he only travels on forbidden tracks, where the God of War may surprise him; that he ought always to keep his eye on the enemy, in order that he may not have to defend himself with a dress rapier if the enemy takes up a sharp sword." ⁴⁷

The words might well have been spoken by the oracle

⁴⁷ Von Clausewitz, General Carl; On War, Trans. by Colonel J.J. Graham; Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., LTD., London; E.P. Dutton and Co., N.Y., 1918., Vol. I, p.45.

at the temple of Mars Grad'ivus.

And we had better listen closely, for these truly are our alternatives. Will one of us wear the sword always? Or will we attempt to trade in our rapier each time we are faced with crisis? To carry the sword need not mean to rattle it; and, at least for the foreseeable future, I submit that it is the sword and not the rapier which must be at our side. If I were to choose that sword, I would select it from fine, light, British steel, not the heavy Prussian variety. And I would have it honed by the best American craftsmen. And I would see that someone wore it constantly.



V

EPILOGUE

If we could journey to the temple of Mars Quiri'nus, perhaps we could save ourselves a great deal of wear and tear, or worse. What would be the oracle's message? This is what I hear: Do whatever you must to make the most of your riches; they are great but not unlimited; get the most from what you have; KEEP A STRONG BODY; and visit Grad'ivus. And, travelling to the temple of Mars Grad'ivus, I hear this: Push back the snares of your offices; shrink the response time of your staffs to that which you expect of your armies; use wisdom in your war councils even in peace; KEEP A SWIFT HAND.

Lacking this kind of divine guidance, we must know well and listen closely to what has gone before us. We must not, however, build a future out of history alone. We must be quick to think of the unlikely and test the different. While never forgetting what we have already learned, we must ever be prepared to learn anew.

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